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Abstract
We examine two sources of productivity improvement in the specialized industrial clus-
ters. Agglomeration improves the productivity of each plant through positive externalities,
shifting plant-level productivity distribution to the right. Selection expels less productive
plants through competition, truncating distribution on the left. By analyzing the data of
the early twentieth century Japanese silk-reeling industry, we ﬁnd no evidence conﬁrming a
right shift in the distribution in clusters or that agglomeration promotes faster productivity
growth. These ﬁndings imply that the plant-selection eﬀect was the source of higher produc-
tivity in the Japanese silk-reeling clusters.
Keywords: Economic geography; Heterogeneous ﬁrms; Selection; Productivity
JEL classiﬁcation: R12; O18; L10
1 Introduction
Plants located in industrial clusters are more productive than those not located in clusters.
Indeed, a positive association between the spatial concentration of economic activities and pro-
ductivity has been empirically conﬁrmed in the economic literature. For example, labor density
is known to have a positive eﬀect on productivity in the United States (Ciccone and Hall, 1996)
and in EU countries (Ciccone, 2002) at the regional level. This also holds true at the plant-level
in the U.S. high-tech industry (Henderson, 2003). Excellent review of the existing studies on
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1spatial concentration and productivity can be found in Rosenthal and Strange (2004) and Melo
et al. (2009).
The higher productivity of plants in industrial clusters has long been explained through ag-
glomeration eﬀects, which refer to positive localized externalities: transferring knowledge and
innovating ideas among densely agglomerated workers, alleviating matching through thick la-
bor markets, or reducing transaction costs by transacting with proximate ﬁrms. These positive
externalities directly improve plant-level productivity in the form of “bonuses” in the agglomer-
ation. However, recent theoretical developments in spatial economics with heterogeneous ﬁrms
have suggested on another factor that could improve productivity: plant-selection. That is, in
clusters, the intensiﬁcation of competition expels less productive plants, and consequently, only
the relatively productive plants survive. Thus, clusters have higher average regional productiv-
ity, even though they do not actually improve the productivity of each plant. This eﬀect was
initially proposed in the ﬁeld of international trade and later introduced into economic geogra-
phy (Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Behrens et al., 2009; Baldwin and Okubo, 2006).
Empirically, Syverson (2004) ﬁnds that higher plant density truncates the productivity distri-
bution in the lower tail in the ready-mixed concrete industry, implying that low-productivity
producers were less likely to survive under increased competition. In the ﬁeld of international
trade, Corcos et al. (2010) have identiﬁed the selection eﬀect induced by trade policy.
Which of these two eﬀects, agglomeration or selection, is more important to the improve-
ment of plant-level productivity in specialized industrial clusters? Recently, a pioneering work
by Combes et al. (2009) measured the magnitudes of the two eﬀects and found that agglomer-
ation eﬀects could mostly explain higher productivity in French metropolitan areas. However,
can productivity improvement in specialized industrial clusters also be explained by agglom-
eration eﬀects? It should be noted that the agglomeration eﬀects in turn can be classiﬁed
into two subcategories depending on the sources of the externalities: industry speciﬁc exter-
nalities and externalities through various industries. Glaeser et al. (1992) termed the former
category Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) externalities, and the latter category is termed Jacobs
externalities (Jacobs, 1969). Because Combes et al. (2009) focused on the urban metropolitan
employment areas and applied labor density in all of the sectors as the source of externalities,
the agglomeration eﬀect they detected was the mixed eﬀect of both MAR and Jacobs external-
ities. In contrast, specialized industrial clusters of plants within the same industry, such as the
high-tech cluster in the Silicon Valley (U.S.) or automobile clusters in Detroit (U.S.) and Toyota
(Japan), are mainly representative of the MAR type of agglomeration economies.
The purpose of this paper is to identify the source of productivity improvement eﬀects
in specialized industrial clusters. Particularly, we focus on the Japanese silk-reeling industry
during the period from 1908 to 1915. In this period, Japan became the largest exporter of
raw silk, competing with Italy and China (Ishii 1972; Nakabayashi 2003). The Japanese silk-
reeling industry then possessed a number of characteristics well-suited to the purposes of this
work. First, clusters existed at the time: the Japanese silk-reeling industry formed huge clusters
in the central and northeastern regions of Japan. These regions were mostly mountainous,
peripheral areas with few plants other than the silk-reeling ones, implying that interactions
between industries were limited. Second, besides the clustered plants, there existed numerous
silk-reeling plants across Japan, allowing us to take regional variations into account in the
empirical analysis. Third, the silk-reeling industry produced a single homogenous product— raw
silk— with similar equipment and technologies using a simple production process. Moreover,
our dataset includes the information regarding the physical output and not the value of raw-
silk. These features allow us to estimate plant-level physical productivities more accurately than
value-based productivities, which suﬀer from price and quality diﬀerences.
To distinguish between agglomeration and selection eﬀects empirically, we follow the ap-
proach proposed by Combes et al. (2009), which examines the distribution of plant-level pro-
2ductivity. Combes et al. (2009) have developed a framework that nests selection and agglom-
eration by extending the model presented in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and introducing the
agglomeration economies as done in Fujita and Ogawa (1982) and Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg
(2002). The model provides empirical predictions that enable a distinction to be made between
the two eﬀects by examining the characteristics of productivity distributions. Intuitively, the
agglomeration eﬀect will shift the distribution to the right by improving the productivity of all
plants in a region but keep the shape of the distribution unchanged. However, the selection ef-
fect will left truncate the distribution at a higher productivity level by expelling less productive
plants from the market. Combes et al. (2009) have found that productivity diﬀerences among
French metropolitan areas are explained mostly by agglomeration. While the agglomeration
eﬀect found in Combes et al. (2009) can be considered as a mixed eﬀect of MAR and Jacobs
externalities, we study MAR externalities by focusing on specialized industrial clusters.
We also contribute to the literature by developing a model of agglomeration and selection
through a competition among plants over input procurement, rather than over output sales. The
literature mostly relied on monopolistic competition in the output market to explain agglomer-
ation or selection. However, the silk-reeling plants in our study were price-takers, that is, the
price of raw silk was determined in the international market. Instead of competing in the output
market, the plants aggressively competed over input procurement (cocoon) and labor forces (fe-
male workers). To take this feature into account, we modify Syverson’s (2004) selection model
on competition over the sales of homogeneous output to competition over input procurement.
While Syverson (2004) relies on demand density as the source of selection, we show that the
regional diﬀerence of entry cost can generate industrial clusters endogenously through selection.
We then introduce an agglomeration economy into the model as done in Combes et al. (2009),
and although our method diﬀers, we obtain an identical result with respect to the density eﬀects
in the distributions of plant-level productivity.
Besides distinguishing agglomeration and selection eﬀects by focusing on productivity distri-
bution, we also investigate when productivity improvements occur. If the agglomeration eﬀect
is in place, we should observe a higher productivity growth of plants in clusters after they start
operation. By focusing on the productivity growth rate, we can distinguish the two eﬀects from
a diﬀerent perspective.
Our main empirical ﬁnding is that selection improves productivity in clusters in the Japanese
silk-reeling industry. We ﬁrst conﬁrmed that plants in clusters had relatively higher productivity
on average. Then, we applied the estimation method of Combes et al. (2009) and conﬁrmed that
silk-reeling clusters had a larger selection eﬀect that do non-clustered silk-reeling plants, but not
karger agglomeration (and dilation) eﬀects. We then examined the productivity distributions
via a summary statistics approach and by applying prefectural variations and found that the
width of the distribution for clusters was narrower and more severely left truncated than that
for non-clusters, a result that suggests selection. However, we found no clear evidence that
conﬁrmed the right-shift of the distribution for cluster. This evidence ais consistent with plant-
selection but not the agglomeration eﬀect. We also examined whether the productivity growth
rate was higher in clusters, as implied by the agglomeration eﬀect, and found that the extent of
agglomeration did not aﬀect the productivity growth rate. These results strongly suggest that
productivity improvement took place through selection before operation rather than through
agglomeration economies after entry. Contrary to the results of Combes et al. (2009), which
emphasize the role of the agglomeration eﬀect in metropolitan areas, our results suggest the
importance of the selection eﬀect in specialized industrial clusters.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section overviews the Japanese silk-
reeling industry during the period from 1908 to 1915. Section 3 provides a theoretical explanation
of industrial clusters and plant-level productivities. Section 4 describes the estimation strategy,
and Section 5 provides our main results. Section 6 discusses the robustness of our ﬁndings by
3using a summary statistics approach and focusing on the timing of the cluster eﬀects. Finally,
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Overview of Japanese silk-reeling industry
The silk-reeling industry was one of the major industries in pre-war Japan1. For example, in
1908, this industry employed 24.4% of the total factory workers in Japan,2 and its product,
raw silk, occupied 26.6% of the total export (Ministry of International Trade and Industry,
1962; Toyo Keiizai Shinposha, 1927). A distinctive feature of the silk-reeling industry was that
it was composed of numerous small and medium-sized plants. For example, in 1908, Japan
had more than 3,200 silk-reeling plants. Even the largest plant accounted for only 4.3% of the
total silk production in 1908, and the median value of the market share was 0.058% (Ministry
of Agriculture and Commerce, 1910). In this sense, the market structure of the silk-reeling
industry was very competitive.
These silk-reeling plants formed several clusters, of which those in the Nagano, Aichi, and
Gifu prefectures in the central region of Japan were the largest; 37.5% of the silk-reeling plants
in Japan were located in these three prefectures in 1908. Of these clusters, the cluster in Suwa
County in Nagano Prefecture was the largest (Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce 1910).
In 1930, to document the history of Hirano Village, the center of the Suwa silk-reeling cluster,
the assigned editors conducted a survey for the major plant owners on the reasons behind the
development of the silk-reeling industry in the village; one of the most common answers was that
they could not secure their living only through agriculture as their land holdings were small and
the soil was not fertile. Some respondents also cited the lack of good alternative occupations as a
reason (Hirano Village Oﬃce 1932, pp.560–562). These answers imply that the opportunity cost
for entering the silk-reeling industry was lower owing to the natural conditions in Suwa District.
These ﬁrst nature characteristics were important causes that facilitated silk-reeling start-ups.
It is also notable that besides the large clusters, silk-reeling plants also operated in other
areas, that is, in non-clusters. Figure 1 is the map of Japan, indicating the density of silk-reeling
plants in 1908. The dark colored areas represent the prefectures where silk-reeling plants were
densely located.
= Figure 1 =
The silk-reeling industry emerged in Japan in the Tokugawa Era, but its growth was accel-
erated by the opening of the economy in 1859. Under the free trade regime, the export of raw
silk experienced a boom. Initially, raw silk was produced by the traditional hand-reeling tech-
nology (zaguri-reeling), but in the 1870s, a new technology, machine-reeling (kikai-reeling), was
developed, which modiﬁed the imported European technology. While hand-reeling production
stagnated owing to competition with Chinese products in the 1870s, machine-reeling production
experienced growth in this period (Nakabayashi 2003, pp.66–68). Machine-reeling production
exceeded hand-reeling production in 1894, and the latter witnessed a decline in 1900.
According to Nakabayashi (2003), the basic market condition was factored by the growth
of the silk weaving industry in the United States. The U.S. silk-weaving industry introduced
its mass production system in the 1860s and preferred homogeneous raw silk in large lots;
meeting this demand was a challenge for the traditional silk-reeling industries in both Japan
1Of the many studies on the development of the silk-reeling industry in Japan, Ishii (1972) and Nakabayashi
(2003) are basic references.
2The denominator is the number of total factory workers in 1909 (Ministry of International Trade and Industry,
1962).
4and China. With the machine-reeling technology, the emerging silk-reeling industry in Japan
met the demand of the U.S silk-weaving industry and thereby grew rapidly.3 In the U.S. market,
each silk-reeling plant in Japan, which as mentioned above, was very small, was basically a price-
taker, and it could sell as much raw silk as it wanted to at the market price in Yokohama, the
main exporting port.
According to Duran (1913), the typical machine-reeling process during that period was as
follows: A silk-reeling plant purchased cocoons from sericulture peasants. Cocoons were boiled
to unwind the cocoon ﬁlaments. Then, from a group of boiled cocoons, unwound ﬁlaments were
bundled and reeled onto a small moving reel that was powered by water, steam, electricity, or
gas. Young female workers played a key role in this production process. Each female worker
was in charge of one reeling machine, and her ability and level of eﬀort substantially aﬀected
the productivity and quality of the raw silk.
Owing to its relatively simple production process, the management productivity and surviv-
ability of the silk-reeling plants essentially depended on the production and management the two
basic inputs, cocoons and labor. Hence, especially in clusters, ﬁerce competition and congestion
characterized the markets of these inputs.
In the cocoons market, competition for procurement was very severe in clusters, raising
input prices not only in the clusters but also in the adjacent prefectures or prefectures farther
away (Hirano, 1990; Ishii, 1972, ch.4; Matsumura, 1992). The competition was ampliﬁed by the
temporal and technological constraint that raw cocoons had to be transported quickly or dried
appropriately to ensure that their quality and condition were maintained because they perished
in moist environments. Drying was also necessary to prevent the metamorphosis of the pupa.
As Kajinishi ed.(1964) states, “As the silk-reeling industry developed in Suwa, competition for
raw materials and work force became harsh among plants, while loss due to transportation cost
and damage of cocoons increased” (pp.304-306). Indeed, in March of 1908, the price of spring
cocoons per koku (180.39 liter) was 50 yen in Matsumoto City (close to Suwa), whereas it was 42
yen in Nagano City (Nagano Prefecture 1910, p.213). To relax competition, silk-reeling plants
attempted (and often failed) to arrange cartels for the joint purchase of cocoons and production
reduction, or they engaged in vertical integration (tokuyaku torihiki) in the form of contract
farming by concluding direct prior agreements with cocoon farmers with regard to price and
quantity.
On the labor side, most of the workers were young women, who were primarily recruited from
surrounding areas so that they could easily commute from their homes. However, the enormous
labor demand in clusters forced plants to hire from remote areas and, therefore, pay a ﬁxed cost
for boarding, food, and even education, consequently increasing the unit labor cost. Moreover,
because silk reeling required some experience and skill, recruiting and training new workers was
expensive for the plants. Therefore, poaching trained workers from other factories was prevalent
in clusters, and the practice gradually proliferated throughout the country (Kambayashi, 2001;
Nakabayashi, 2003; Tojo, 1990). Furthermore, Eguchi and Hidaka eds.(1937) observed that land
prices rose sharply in Suwa because of the expansion of silk-reeling plants and an increase of
workers (p.787).
In the silk-reeling industry, the performance-based wage system was widely used to provide
workers with incentives to improve both productivity and product quality by the early twentieth
century. A distinctive characteristic of this system was that the wage of each worker was deter-
mined on the basis of her relative performance compared to the average of all the workers in the
same plant. The performance was evaluated by several measures including labor productivity,
cocoon productivity and product quality, which were strategic for the competitiveness and prof-
3For example, in 1908, the ratio of the export to production was 98.9% with respect to machine-reeled raw silk
and the share of the United States in the total Japanese raw silk export was 74.0% (calculated from the statistics
in Nakabayashi, 2003, pp.468–462).
5itability of the plant. Nakabayashi (2003) reports the basic statistics of the worker-level wage at
a plant in Suwa from the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century. For example,
sample mean, median, variance, and maximum and minimum values of wage per day in 1908
were 0.24, 0.25, 1.09, 0.62, and 0.018 yen, respectively (p.259). However, the average daily wage
of female agricultural workers was 0.23 yen in the same year (Statistics Bureau, Management
and Coordination Agency 1988, p.228). These facts imply that an unskilled female silk-reeling
worker earned approximately the same amount as did an average agricultural worker, but highly
skilled silk-reeling workers in clusters could earn higher wages depending on their productivity.
It is notable that this wage system was ﬁrst devised by Nakayama Co. in Suwa to diﬀuse within
the district, and then was transmitted to other districts (Ishii, 1972, pp.291–307; Nakabayshi,
2003, pp.241–277). This diﬀusion process can be regarded as a case of rapid knowledge spillover
in an industrial cluster.
3 Theoretical model and empirical strategy
We ﬁrst develop a theoretical framework to model plant-selection in the context of the Japanese
silk-reeling industry by modifying Syverson’s (2004) selection model. Then, we incorporate the
agglomeration eﬀect.
3.1 Market structure
We consider the entry and production decisions of silk-reeling plants that procure cocoons from
farmers, reel silk, and sell the ﬁnal product. Output is sold in the export market (Yokohama)
at an exogenous price p set by the international market. Plants are price-takers and they can
sell as much as they wish in Yokohama.
We assume that the production of qi silk by plant i entails labor cost hiqi, input purchase
cost w(Q)qi for cocoons, and ﬁxed cost f. Silk production relied heavily on female workers who
reeled unwound cocoon ﬁlaments. Silk production relied heavily on female workers who reeled
unwound cocoon ﬁlaments, and their skill and eﬀort were crucial determinants of plant-level
productivity.
While workers’ individual reeling skills were inherently diﬀerent, we assume that all plants
faced the same skill distribution regardless of the plant’s location. Thus, we ignore the het-
erogeneity of workers’ productivity and rely solely on the plant side heterogeneity (i.e., the
capability of the machines, management and incentive systems, training, etc.) to explain the
plant-level productivity diﬀerence.4
We let hi denote the eﬀective labor required to produce one unit of output (raw silk).
This variable can be considered as the plant’s productivity: higher hi implies greater labor
requirement and, hence, lower productivity. We normalize the cost of unit eﬀective labor to
unity.
The input purchase price w(Q) can be considered an aggregate inverse supply function, where
Q =
∑
qi is the total output in the region (or, in other words, factor demand). We assume that
w(Q) increases with Q because greater silk production requires a higher demand for cocoons.
Therefore, unlike the plants modeled in Syverson (2004), for which demand density is the key
variable of focus, plants in our model do not compete over output sales but rather over input
purchase (cocoons).
4While workers’ inherent skills at the individual level may be diﬀerent, there is no reason to assume that its
distribution diﬀered across regions. Moreover, regional migration based on reeling skill was unlikely except for
experienced, top-ranked reelers who mostly engaged in training, which should be considered as the plant’s eﬀort
for productivity improvement.
6The proﬁt of a plant can be represented as
πi = pqi − hiqi − w(Q)qi − f
For simplicity, we assume the linear marginal input purchase price as w(Q) = wQ:
πi = pqi − hiqi − wQqi − f. (1)
This model has two stages. In stage one, each potential plant decides whether to pay a sunk
entry cost s to enter the market. After payment, a plant draws the labor unit requirement hi
from distribution g(h) with support [0,h], where h is an arbitrary upper bound. In stage two,
each plant decides the level of production qi given one’s own productivity parameter hi, forming
an expectation of the total output in a region, E(Q).
The expected proﬁt of an entrant plant at stage two is
E(πi) = (p − hi)qi − wE(Q)qi − f. (2)
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to qi is
∂E(πi)
∂qi
= p − hi − wqi − wE(Q) = 0 (3)
so the optimal output of a plant with marginal cost hi is
qi
∗(hi) =




∗ back into the expected proﬁt yields
E[πi(hi)] =
[p − hi − wE(Q)]2
w
− f. (5)
The expected proﬁt decreases with hi. Therefore, a critical labor unit requirement draw ˆ h exists
such that entrants drawing hi > ˆ h choose not to produce. This cutoﬀ labor unit requirement
draw can be solved by setting E(πi) = 0:
ˆ h(E(Q)) = p − wE(Q) −
√
wf. (6)
Inserting p − wE(Q) = ˆ h +
√
wf obtained from (6) into E(πi) yields operating proﬁts,
conditional on hi ≤ ˆ h:
E
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We assume a free-entry condition so that plants enter the market (i.e., pay s and draw ci) until
















g(h)dh − s = 0 (8)
The equilibrium ˆ h is the value that solves this expression and it is a function of g(h) and
parameters w, f, and s.
73.2 Entry cost, selection eﬀect, and emergence of clusters
We now consider regions that are symmetric except for entry cost s. On the basis of the
historical information in Section 2, we assume that s varied across regions owing to the ﬁrst
nature or opportunity costs of starting-up a new business. We show that a region with lower s
imposes ﬁercer competition (i.e., lower cutoﬀ unit labor requirement) but retains large number
of operating plants, resulting in the formation of a cluster.
We ﬁrst consider the eﬀect of entry cost s on the cut-oﬀ marginal unit labor requirement ˆ h.


















Implication 1 (Selection eﬀect). Regions with a lower start-up cost have a lower cutoﬀ labor
unit requirement ˆ h. This relationship implies that competition is more severe: high-cost (low-
productivity) plants are not proﬁtable in regions with a lower start-up cost.
Next, we investigate the eﬀect of s on the number of plants in a region. Let Ne denote
the number of entrant plants that had paid s and drawn hi, and let Np denote the number of




g(h)dh = NeG(ˆ h). (10)










g(h)dh − NeE(Q)G(ˆ h).
Since Q = E(Q) in the equilibrium, we can represent Q as a function of Ne and ˆ h:
Q(Ne,ˆ h) =
Ne






Additionally, rearranging (6) yields
Q =





By applying (11) and (12), we can represent Ne as a function of ˆ h and g(·), and parameters
{p,w,f}:
Ne =




















0 (ˆ h − h +
√
wf)g(h)dh
]2 < 0. (14)
Therefore, lower ˆ h (ﬁercer selection) entails more entry.













The eﬀect of s on Np consists of two eﬀects. The ﬁrst eﬀect represented by the ﬁrst term is the
entry eﬀect, which is negative. That is, lower s entails that more plants will enter the market.
The second eﬀect represented by the second term is the competition eﬀect, which is positive
because dˆ h
ds > 0 from (9). Because lower s induces severe competition, the number of plants that
can produce after entry will be smaller. The aggregate eﬀect of a low entry cost on the number
of producing plants depends on the relative magnitudes of the (positive) entry eﬀect and the
(negative) competition eﬀect. However, we can show that the entry eﬀect always dominates the
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This value is negative because
[




is positive because G(ˆ h) ≥ G(h) for
all h ∈ [0,ˆ h], G(ˆ h) > g(ˆ h), and dˆ h
ds > 0 from (9).
Implication 2 (Endogenous clusters). Lower entry cost s entails that more plants will enter
the market (entry eﬀect), but it imposes ﬁercer competition after entry and reduces the number
of producing plants (competition eﬀect). The former always dominates the latter, and therefore,
the number of producing plants is greater in a region with lower s.
3.3 Agglomeration eﬀects and productivity distributions
Following Combes et al. (2009), we now introduce the agglomeration eﬀect, which improves
plants’ productivities through the interaction between adjacent operating plants. We model
this eﬀect by assuming that when a plant interacts with Np plants, the eﬀective units of labor
supplied by an individual worker during their unit time becomes a(Np), where a(0) = 1, a′ > 0,
and a′′ < 0. The improved productivity of workers should be compensated for by higher wages
if the labor market is perfect.5 However, a plant with unit labor requirement hi reduces the
number of workers to l(hi) = qihi/a(Np) at a total cost of a(Np)l(hi) = qihi. Thus, each plant’s
maximization problem is unchanged.











= ln[a(Np)] − ln(hi) (17)
Then, the density function of the log productivities is as follows:
f(φ) =
{
0 for φ < ˆ φ ≡ A − ln(ˆ h),
eA−φg(eA−φ)
G(ˆ h) for φ > ˆ φ,
(18)
where A ≡ ln[a(Np)].
5Indeed, the performance-based wage system was prevalent in the silk-reeling clusters (Nakabayashi, 2003).
9As discussed above, each plants’ maximization problem is unchanged regardless of the pres-
ence of the agglomeration eﬀect. Thus, plugging the equilibrium cut-oﬀ unit labor requirement
ˆ h obtained from eq. (8) into eq. (18) yields the equilibrium distribution of plant productivities.
From this productivity density function and the assumption of a′ > 0, it is clear that the increase
in the number of operating plants slides the distribution rightward while maintaining its form.
Implication 3 (Agglomeration eﬀects). An increase in the number of operating plants in a
region Np shifts the productivity distribution to the right.
Fortunately, the result of our model with respect to the productivity distribution is identical
to that of Combes et al. (2009), although the method is diﬀerent. Thus, we can apply their
novel empirical strategy. To do so, we introduce additional notations.
Let Fi(φ) be the corresponding cumulative density function of f(φ). The proportion of ﬁrms
that cannot survive in city i is deﬁned as Si ≡ 1 − G(¯ hi). The underlying cumulative density
function of log productivities in all cities when there is no selection and no agglomeration eﬀects
(¯ hi → ∞ and Ai = 0, ∀i) can be deﬁned as follows:
˜ F(φ) ≡ 1 − G(e−φ), (19)
because φ = 0, and if Ai = 0, then, h = e−φ and there is a change of variables. Then, the









Because the results of productivity distribution from our model are identical to those of
Combes et al. (2009), we can consider the following four polar cases with respect to the channels
of productivity improvement, as did the Combes et al. (2009) model. For simplicity, we consider
two regions r = c (cluster) and r = n (non-cluster).
Case 1 (Only the selection eﬀect matters). When there is no agglomeration eﬀect, only selec-
tion aﬀects productivity. In this case, a(Np) = 1 holds for any value of Np. However, selection
implies that ˆ hc < ˆ hn, where ˆ hc ( ˆ hn) is the cutoﬀ unit labor requirement in region c(n). This
raises the log productivity cut-oﬀ in the cluster: ˆ φc > ˆ φn. This case is represented in Figure
2(a). The solid line represents the log productivity distribution in the cluster, while the dashed
line represents that in the non-cluster. The log productivity distribution in the cluster is left
truncated.
Case 2 (Only the agglomeration eﬀect matters). In this case, only the agglomeration eﬀect im-
proves the plants’ productivity. To eliminate the selection eﬀects, we impose sc = sn = s, where
sc (sn) is the startup cost in region c (n). Then, the intention of the selection is the same in
the both cluster and non-cluster, and therefore, ˆ hc = ˆ hn and Npc = Npn, where Npc (Npn) is the
number of plants in region c (n). To establish clusters and non-clusters, we assume Nc > Nn by
exogenous reasons that are outside the scope of our model. Only ﬁrms in clusters beneﬁt from
larger worker interactions, ln[a(Npc)] > ln[a(Npn)]. Thus, the log productivity simply slides to
the right while maintaining its distribution form. This case is shown in Figure 2(b).
Case 3 (Both the selection and agglomeration eﬀects matter). In this case, the ﬁxed entry costs
are diﬀerent between the cluster and non-cluster, sc < sn, and the concentration of workers
improves their productivity, a′ > 0 and a′′ < 0. Thus, both left truncations by selection and
right slide by agglomeration occur in the cluster. This case is shown in Figure 2(c).
10Case 4 (Neither eﬀect matters). In this case, the ﬁxed entry costs are the same for all regions
and the concentration of workers does not improve their productivity, a(Np) = 1. Then, log
productivity distribution is common across regions. Thus, there is no diﬀerence in the produc-
tivities across regions. This case is shown in Figure 2(d).
= Figures 2(a) to 2(d) =
Intuitively, these four cases are distinguished by two measures that characterize the produc-
tivity distributions. The ﬁrst measure is the interquartile range of the distribution, which was
used by Syverson (2004). If no selection eﬀect exists (cases 2 and 4), the shape of the distribu-
tion should be the same for clusters and non-clusters, and thus, the interquartile range should
have no diﬀerence. However, if a selection eﬀect exists (cases 1 and 3), the productivity distri-
bution should be left truncated in clusters and the interquartile range should be smaller than
for non-clusters. Hence, by comparing the interquartile range between clusters and non-clusters,
we would be able to detect the presence of the selection eﬀect.6
The second measure consists of the percentiles of the distribution. Because selection left
truncates the distribution, we should observe a rise of lower percentile points rather than higher
percentile points of log-productivity distribution. However, the agglomeration eﬀect aﬀects every
percentile point of the distribution because it shifts the whole distribution rightwards. Thus,
if the agglomeration eﬀects are in place, both the higher and lower percentile points of the
distribution should increase.
The above discussions are summarized in Table 1.
= Table 1 =
The table represents the direction of the shift of each measure of distribution in clusters
relative to non-clusters for four cases.
The next section describes formal estimation strategy based on the theory.
4 Empirical strategy
As we have shown in the previous chapter, our theoretical results in plant-level log of productivity
distribution is identical to the Combes et al. (2009) results, although the theoretical set up is
diﬀerent. Thus, we can apply their novel empirical strategy for quantitatively measuring each
density eﬀect, selection and agglomeration. This section brieﬂy describes the empirical strategy.
For more detail, please see Combes et al. (2009).
Because the underlying baseline distribution function ˜ F(φ) is unknown, we cannot esti-
mate exact values of Ai, Di, and Si for each region, but by comparing the distributions of log
productivities across clusters and non-clusters, we can estimate the relative strength of those
parameters.
Before describing the estimation strategy, we address the concern that the impact of the
agglomeration eﬀect varies by plant. For example, highly productive plants would tend to more
rapidly beneﬁt from agglomeration economies. To include this eﬀect, we redeﬁne the agglom-
eration economies by introducing heterogeneity of beneﬁting from agglomeration economy. By
6Of course, variance is also an informative measure of truncation. However, empirically, the interquartile range
is more robust for outliers.
11introducing heterogeneity, the agglomeration economy a(Np) can be rewritten as a(Np)h−(Di−1),
where Di ≡ ln[d(Np)], d(0) = 1, d′ > 0, and d′′ < 0. Then, the log productivity of a ﬁrm with






= Ai − Di ln(h). (21)











This implies that agglomeration eﬀects not only slides the distribution to the right by Ai, but
also dilates the distribution by Di; however, selection drops a share of Si of entrants. It is worth
noting that the heterogeneity also allows for the case that low productivity plants beneﬁt more
than do high productivity plants from the agglomeration economy. In this case, Di takes a
negative value.
Based on the extended model, we describe the estimation strategy. As in the previous section,
we consider two regions, r = c (cluster) and r = n (non-cluster), and the cumulative density




























By introducing these parameters, we can express the cumulative density functions Fc(φ) and
Fn(φ) in terms of the other expression in such a way that clariﬁes their relationship. If Sc > Sn,











If Sc < Sn, Fn can also be obtained from Fc by dilating 1
D, shifting by − A
D, and left-truncating











Then, following the approach of Combes et al. (2009), we obtain estimators of A,S, and D.7
This approach do not separately estimate Ar, Dr, and Sr in each region, but instead estimates
the relative strength of each variable that A = Ac −DAn, D = Dc/Dn, and S = (Sc −Sn)/(1−
Sn). That is, we estimate the relative strength of selection and agglomeration in the specialized
clusters compared to the non-clusters. Intuitively, if we obtain A > 0, there is larger right shift
in the clusters than in the non-clusters. Dilation by agglomeration is captured by D. If we
7For the detail of the estimation method, see Combes et al. (2009).
12obtain D > 1, clusters have larger dilation of the distribution than the non-clusters. Selection
is captured by S. If we obtain S > 0, there is more elimination of entrants in the clusters than
in the non-clusters.
5 Data and the measure of plant-level productivity
5.1 Data
We compiled the data of the silk-reeling industry census data, Zenkoku Seishi Kojo Chosa, for the
two data points 1908 and 1915. The data include plant-level information of plant name, location,
year of foundation, number of pots, number of workers, number of business days per year, type of
powers, and output. This data set covers both hand-reeling and machine-reeling plants. Here,
we focus on machine reeling plants because hand-reeling and machine-reeling are completely
diﬀerent techniques. We matched plants over two periods and constructed an unbalanced panel
data set by using the plant name, location, and year of foundation. The number of machine-
reeling plants in 1908 was 2385 and that in 1915 was 2263. The number of plants that existed
in 1908 and survived until 1915 was 910. The extent of agglomeration is measured by regional
plant density, computed as number of plants per km2. Information regarding the regional area
at the prefecture or county level was obtained from the GIS (Geographical Information System)
data for 1937, from “Taisho-Showa Gyoseikai Data.”8
5.2 Measures of plant-level productivity
As discussed in the previous section, we focus on the shape of the productivity distributions to
distinguish the channels of productivity improvement eﬀects. For this purpose, we ﬁrst estimate
the productivity of each plant. We use Total Factor Productivity (TFP) as the primary measure
of plant-level productivity. In order to estimate TFP, we specify the ﬁrm-level production
function as follows:
yit = βkkit + βllit + βmmit + δZit + ωit + ϵit, (28)
where yit is the log of output, kit is the log of capital input (number of pots), lit is the log
of labor inputs (number of female workers), mit is the log of intermediate input (quantity of
cocoons used), Zit is the vector of the plant i’s observable characteristics, ωit and ϵi are the
productivity terms that are unobservable to the econometrician. While ϵit is also unobserved by
ﬁrms before they make their input decisions, ωit is observable. We assume ωit = ωi, that is, the
observable productivity for plants does not change through the study period (7 years). As the
plant i’s observable characteristics, we include the log of plant age, a dummy variable indicating
that the plant used water power, and a dummy variable indicating that the plant used steam
power. Given this assumption, we estimate this production function by the ﬁxed eﬀect model.9
The estimation results are reported in Table 2.
= Table 2 =
8The data is published by Yuji Murayama, Division of Spatial Information Sci-
ence, Graduate School of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Tsukuba, URL:
http://giswin.geo.tsukuba.ac.jp/teacher/murayama/data map.html
9Alternative way of estimating TFP, structural approach proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) that relaxes
the assumption of ωit = ωi is potentially useful, but the limitation of our dataset that seven years apart each
period makes diﬃcult for application of the method of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
13The coeﬃcients of ln (capital) and ln (worker) have expected signs and magnitudes with
high statistical signiﬁcance. The coeﬃcient of ln (intermediate) is positive, but not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. We interpret yit − ˆ βkkit − ˆ βllit + ˆ βmmit − ˆ δZit as the TFP of plant i in
period t. We also use the output per pot (capital productivity) and output per worker (labor
productivity) as alternative measures of plant-level productivity. In the Japanese silk-reeling
industry, the output per pot and output per worker were conventionally used as measures to
evaluate plant-level productivity.
6 Main results
We now show the estimation results and distinguish the relative size of agglomeration eﬀects
and selection eﬀects.
We use a prefecture as a unit of observation of regional productivity density to obtain
suﬃcient observations. All prefectures in Japan are classiﬁed into two groups on the basis
of regional plant densities (number of plants per km2 in a region). Prefectures with plant
densities higher than the median value are classiﬁed into the clustered prefectures, and the other
prefectures are classiﬁed into the non-clustered prefectures.
First, we estimate the kernel density functions10 of the plant-level productivity for each group
of prefectures. Figure 3 represents the kernel densities.
= Figure 3 =
The solid line refers to the density of the clustered prefectures and the dashed line refers to the
density of the non-clustered prefectures. In every ﬁgure, the estimated density in the lower tail
of the distribution is lower for the clustered prefectures than for the non-clustered prefectures,
while the density in the higher tail of the distributions is similar for the two prefecture groups.
Moreover, the shapes and positions of the two distributions seem to be similar except for the
lower tails. There is no clear sign that the distribution of the clustered prefectures slides to
the right. Given the predictions summarized in Table 1, these features of the two distributions
suggest that a selection eﬀect existed but an agglomeration eﬀect did not.
These observations are also conﬁrmed by the descriptive statistics of the productivity distri-
butions shown in Table 3.
= Table 3 =
Panel A represents the statistics for 1908 and Panel B represents those for 1915. The mean
productivities are signiﬁcantly higher in the cluster for every productivity measure and period,
indicating that plants located in the industrial clusters were indeed more productive than those
in the non-clusters.
Our conventional predictions in Table 1 suggest that the interquartile range is informative
in detecting selection eﬀects. If the productivity distribution is truncated by selection, we
should observe a shorter interquartile range. We can also examine the existence of selection
and agglomeration eﬀects by looking at the percentiles of distribution at lower and higher tails:
while selection aﬀects only the lower tail, agglomeration aﬀects every support of the distribution
because agglomeration shifts the whole distribution rightwards. Hence, if the agglomeration
eﬀect exists, both lower and higher tails of the distribution should shift to the right.
10We estimate the density functions by using the Epanechnikov kernel with optimal bandwidth.
14Table 3 reveals that the interquartile range of the distribution in the clustered prefectures
is smaller than that in the non-clustered prefectures. This suggests the truncation of the dis-
tribution implied by plant-selection. This interpretation is further supported by the percentiles
of the distribution. In the lower tails (the 10th and 25th percentiles), percentiles in clusters
are much higher than in non-clusters. For example, in 1908, while the 10th percentile in the
cluster is –0.21, the same percentile in the non-cluster is –0.33, and the diﬀerence is 0.1. How-
ever, in higher tails, percentiles in both the cluster and non-cluster are quite similar (the 90th
percentile in both cluster and non-cluster are 0.18). These ﬁndings are consistent with Case 1
in Table 1: productivity distribution is left truncated but no right shift is observed. According
to our theoretical prediction, this implies the existence of plant-selection and non-existence of
the agglomeration eﬀect.
The estimation results are shown in the Table 4.
= Table 4 =
These results are for three measures of productivities and for two periods. Column (1) in Table
4 reports our results for TFP in 1909. The point estimate of A is negative but not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, while that of D is greater than one but not statistically diﬀerent from one.
These values suggest that there is no larger rightward shift of the distribution and dilations
in the silk-reeling clusters compared to the non-clusters. However, the point estimate of S is
positive and statistically diﬀerent from zero, suggesting that there is more elimination of the
distributions in the clusters compared to the non-clusters. These results strongly suggest that
there are larger selection eﬀects and no larger agglomeration (and dilation) eﬀects in the silk-
reeling clusters than in the non-clusters. That is, the higher plant-level productivity in the silk
reeling clusters can be explained only by the selection eﬀects. This result is the exact opposite
of the result of Combes et al. (2009) that focuses on the urban metropolitan area.
This result is robust for the measure of productivities and periods. In every Column, the
point estimate of S is positive and statistically diﬀerent from zero. However, the point estimate
of A is negative but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, while that of D is greater than one but
not statistically diﬀerent from one with the exception of Column (3). These results suggest the
robustness of our conclusion: that the higher plant-level productivity in the silk reeling clusters
can be explained only by the selection eﬀects.
In sum, there was larger selection and was no agglomeration (and dilation) in the specialized
silk-reeling clusters than in the non-clusters robustly. These results suggest that the higher
plant-level productivity in the silk reeling clusters can be explained only by the selection eﬀects.
Why were there no agglomeration economies in the silk-reeling clusters? One possible reason
is that the major innovative knowledge for improving productivity had already spread by this
period. Nakabayashi (2003) showed that productivity of a silk-reeling plant in prewar Japan was
principally determined by machines and the mode of labor management, and that a substan-
tial innovation occurred in the latter in the Suwa district in the 1900s. That is, a sophisticated
performance-based wage system was devised to provide appropriate incentives to female workers.
In this system, performance of each female worker was evaluated by several measures includ-
ing labor productivity, cocoon productivity and product quality, which were strategic for the
competitiveness and proﬁtability of the plant (pp.241-288). Notably, this wage system was ﬁrst
devised in Suwa, but had widely diﬀused in Japan by the early 1910s (Ishii, 1972, p.300). In
this sense, there was little room for productivity improvement through learning in the 1910s.
157 Robustness checks
7.1 Prefectural variations
In the previous section, we found, by the method developed by Combes et al. (2009), that there
was larger selection but no agglomeration in the silk-reeling cluster than in the non-clusters. This
method is theoretically and statistically rigorous, but it cannot fully utilize regional variations
because the method compares two distributions of log of productivities. However, our method to
distinguish the agglomeration eﬀect and the selection eﬀect by the summary statistics of the log
of productivity distribution as was done in Syverson (2004) and as described in the Table 1 was
not rigorously developed but can fully utilize the prefectural variations. Although the summary
statistics approach cannot purely distinguish the agglomeration eﬀect and the selection eﬀect,
it yields a useful approximation. This section adopts the summary statistics approach to check
the robustness of the previous results.
Based on Table 1, we ﬁrst investigate the eﬀect of plant-densities on the interquartile range
of productivity distribution. We index each prefecture by p and estimate the following equation:
IQRpt = α + β ln(Dpt) + yeart + εpt (29)
where IQRpt refers to the interquartile range of plant-level productivity distribution in prefecture
p in period t, Dpt is the plant density and yeart is the year ﬁxed eﬀects. Under the presence of
selection eﬀects, an increase in the plant density will truncate the distribution and shorten the
interquartile range; thus, we expect a negative sign for β. We estimate this equation by pooled
OLS with year ﬁxed eﬀects. Because this estimation focuses on the productivity distribution
and requires a certain number of observations (plants) in each prefecture, we restrict samples to
prefectures that had more than 20 plants. The results are shown in columns (1) to (3) in Table
5.
= Table 5 =
In every result (columns 1–3), the coeﬃcients of plant density are negative and statistically
signiﬁcant. This suggests the truncation of productivity distributions, which is consistent with
the existence of the selection eﬀect.
Next, we examine the role of the agglomeration eﬀect by focusing on the percentiles of
productivity distribution. We estimate the following equation:
Pu
pt = α + β ln(Dpt) + yeart + εpt, (30)
where Pu
pt is the u-th percentile of the log productivity distribution in prefecture p for period t.
The equation is estimated by pooled OLS.
The results are shown in Table 6.
= Table 6 =
Columns (1) to (4) use TFP as a measure of productivity while columns (5) to (8) and (9)
to (12) use output per pot and output per worker respectively. Regardless of the measure of
productivity, coeﬃcients of plant density are positive and signiﬁcant for the lower tail, that is,
the 10th and 25th percentiles (columns 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, and 10). This result is consistent with both
the agglomeration eﬀect and selection eﬀects. However, every coeﬃcient of plant density is not
statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 75th or 90th percentiles (columns 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, and 12).
16This implies that higher plant density had no eﬀect on the productivity distribution shifting
rightwards. The evidence runs contrary to the existence of the agglomeration eﬀect.
These results indicate that the increase of plant density truncated the log productivity dis-
tribution in the lower tail but had no eﬀect in shifting the distribution rightwards. This is
consistent with the existence of the selection eﬀect and non-existence of the agglomeration ef-
fect (Case 1 in Table 1). The results obtained in this section strongly support our main result
that the higher plant-level productivity in the silk reeling clusters can be explained only by the
selection eﬀects.
7.2 Productivity growth after operation
According to the results obtained in the previous sections, there is no agglomeration eﬀects in
the clusters. Did the concentration of the plants actually have no positive externality to the
plants located there? For the ﬁnal robustness check, we examine the timing of the productivity
growth.
Our strategy is as follows. If the agglomeration eﬀect is in place and learning from leading
plants improves plant-level productivities, we would observe faster productivity growth in clus-
ters than in non-clusters after the plants are operational.11 Thus, we check the productivity
growth after operation by comparing the productivity growth rates between plants in clusters
and non-clusters.
Descriptive statistics of productivity growth rate from 1908 to 1915 for three diﬀerent pro-
ductivity measures are shown in Table 7.
= Table 7 =
Younger plants might tend to learn and improve their productivity faster than older plants.
We report descriptive statistics for start-up plants separately. We deﬁne start-up plants as plants
with age less than ﬁve years.
For every productivity measure, the average productivity growth rate is similar for the cluster
and non-cluster. Rather, the average growth rate in the cluster is smaller than in the non-cluster.
We test the diﬀerence of average productivity growth rate between the cluster and non-cluster
using a t-test, but the null hypothesis that the mean diﬀerence of growth rate between the
cluster and non-cluster is zero is not rejected at the conventional levels of statistics for every
measure of productivity. Furthermore, this relationship also holds even if we restrict samples
to start-up plants. Overall, start-up plants grew faster than older plants in terms of every
productivity measure. Meanwhile, the average productivity growth rate of start-up plants in
the cluster is again lower than in the non-cluster, and we also cannot reject the null hypothesis
that the mean diﬀerence of the growth rate between the cluster and non-cluster is zero in every
measure of productivity. Thus, there is no evidence that plants learned faster in clusters than
in non-clusters.
To control plant-level diﬀerences, we econometrically test the learning eﬀects in clusters, by
estimating the following equation,
GrowthRateicp = α + βDcp + δZicp + γProductivity1908icp + prefp + εicp, (31)
where GrowthRateicp is the productivity growth rate of plant i located in county c in prefecture
p from 1908 to 1915, Dcp is the plant density at county level, and Zicp is the vector of plant-level
11Such dynamics of productivity growth is not introduced into our theoretical model. But, technological ex-
ternality does occur gradually rather than instantaneously. In a sense, this section considers the agglomeration
economies separately from our baseline model.
17control variables (number of pots, number of workers, age, steam power dummy, water power
dummy). To control low-productivity plants’ faster learning and growth (catch-up), we include
the initial productivity in 1908. Table 8 reports the results.
= Table 8 =
Again, we use three measures for the plant-level productivity. Column (1) is the baseline
result. Even after controlling for plant-level variables, the coeﬃcient of plant density is not
statistically diﬀerent from zero. That is, plants in clusters did not improve their productivity
faster than plants in non-clusters. Column (2) controls initial productivity in 1908. Interestingly,
the coeﬃcient of initial productivity in 1908 is negative and signiﬁcant, suggesting a catch-up
by low-productivity plants. However, the coeﬃcient of plant density is still not statistically
diﬀerent from zero. Low-productivity plants did learn and catch-up, but their speed was not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for clusters and non-clusters. This result is robust to the alternative
measures of productivity (columns 3–6) or restricted samples of start-up plants (columns 7–12).
The coeﬃcient of initial productivity in 1908 is signiﬁcantly negative but the plant density is not
statistically diﬀerent from zero. In sum, these results do not support the presence of learning
implied by the agglomeration eﬀect. Low-productivity plants did catch up, but we ﬁnd no
evidence that plants in clusters improved their productivity faster than did their counterparts in
non-clusters. The concentration of plants did not have any productivity growth eﬀect in these
periods. This result also supports our main result that the higher plant-level productivity in the
silk reeling clusters can be explained only by the selection eﬀects.
8 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we attempted to distinguish the two channels through which industrial clusters
improved plant-level productivity, focusing on the Japanese silk-reeling industry during the
period from 1908 to 1915. On the basis of nested model of selection and agglomeration, we
considered the agglomeration eﬀect, which improves the productivities of all the plants in a
region and the plant-selection eﬀect, which raised the average regional productivity by expelling
less productive plants through intense competition.
Using plant-level data, we distinguished the channels of productivity improvement on the
basis of the estimation method proposed by Combes et al. (2009). We found on one hand that
there was left-truncation of the log of the productivity distribution in the clusters relative to
the non-clusters, and on the other hand, that there was no rightward shift and dilation of the
distribution. These ﬁndings suggest that the higher plant-level productivity in the silk reeling
clusters can be explained only by the selection eﬀect. These main ﬁndings were robust for
the alternative method to detect those eﬀects via prefectural variations and summary statistics
of the distribution. It is further supported by the ﬁnding that there was no diﬀerence in the
productivity growth rate of individual plants between clusters and non-clusters. This result
implied that productivity growth through learning suggested by the agglomeration eﬀect was
not evident. We suspect that the possible reason for this lack of agglomeration eﬀect is that the
major innovative knowledge for improving productivity (i.e., performance-based wage system)
had already spread by this period.
We therefore conclude that in the Japanese silk-reeling industry higher average productivity
in clusters was not caused by the agglomeration eﬀect but through selection; that is, the inten-
siﬁcation of competition in clusters expelled the low-productivity plants, and consequently, only
relatively more productive plants survived.
18Our ﬁnding is contrary to that of Combes et al. (2009), who found that productivity diﬀer-
ences between French metropolitan areas are explained mostly by agglomeration. This diﬀer-
ence suggests the density eﬀect is diﬀerent in the metropolitan areas and specialized industrial
clusters. That is, agglomeration economies in the metropolitan areas are larger than those in
specialized clusters, whereas more severe competition and selection occur in the specialized clus-
ters than in the metropolitan areas. This ﬁnding suggests the importance of competition in
improving productivity in specialized industrial clusters.
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20Table 1: Measures of distribution in clusters relative to non-clusters
Cases Mean Interquartile range Lower percentile Higher percentile
Case 1: Selection + – + +
Case 2: Agglomeration + 0 + ++
Case 3: Selection & agglomeration + – + ++
Case 4: Neither eﬀect 0 0 0 0
Table 2: Estimation result of plant-level productivity
Water power Steam power
ln(capital) ln(labor) ln(intermediates) ln(age) dummy dummy Constant No. obs. R2
0.152** 0.153** 0.719** 0.056** 0.053* 0.004 2.170 ** 4479 0.955
(0.056) (0.074) (0.076) (0.022) (0.032) (0.035) (0.134)
Note: The dependent variable represents the log of output. The capital represents the number of pots, labor
represents the number of workers, and intermediates represents the quantity of cocoons. Estimated by OLS with
plant ﬁxed eﬀects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
21Table 3: Descriptive statistics of plant-level productivity
Panel A: 1909
Measure of Cluster vs. Interquartile 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Productivity Non-cluster Mean range Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile
TFP
All -0.03 0.22 -0.27 -0.14 -0.01 0.09 0.18
Cluster -0.002 0.19 -0.21 -0.09 0.01 0.1 0.18
Non-cluster -0.05 0.26 -0.33 -0.18 -0.04 0.08 0.18
(4.288)
Output per pot
All 3.95 0.71 3.2 3.62 4.03 4.33 4.57
Cluster 4.07 0.57 3.44 3.82 4.07 4.39 4.57
Non-cluster 3.82 0.82 2.96 3.43 3.92 4.25 4.56
(10.031)
Output per Worker
All 3.92 0.66 3.16 3.63 4.00 4.29 4.51
Cluster 4.04 0.55 3.44 3.81 4.06 4.35 4.54
Non-cluster 3.8 0.79 2.96 3.44 3.93 4.23 4.47
(10.113)
Panel B: 1916
Measure of Cluster vs. Interquartile 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Productivity Non-cluster Mean range Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile
TFP
All 0.03 0.28 -0.27 -0.1 0.06 0.18 0.29
Cluster 0.04 0.24 -0.2 -0.07 0.07 0.18 0.28
Non-cluster 0.004 0.34 -0.34 -0.15 0.05 0.19 0.29
(3.218)
Output per pot
All 4.17 0.87 3.22 3.78 4.29 4.65 4.93
Cluster 4.26 0.79 3.53 3.87 4.34 4.66 4.93
Non-cluster 4.05 1.04 2.93 3.59 4.19 4.63 4.94
(7.180)
Output per Worker
All 4.14 0.83 3.24 3.76 4.26 4.6 4.86
Cluster 4.23 0.77 3.49 3.85 4.31 4.61 4.88
Non-cluster 4.02 0.94 2.91 3.62 4.18 4.56 4.83
(7.581)
Note: TFP is estimated by the ﬁxed eﬀect OLS. The t-values of the t-test are presented in parentheses. The null
hypotheses of the t-test is that the average productivities is not diﬀerent for clusters and non-clusters.
22Table 4: Main estimation results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Measure of Productivity TFP TFP Output per pot Output per pot Output per worker Output per worker
Year 1909 1916 1909 1916 1909 1916
A (relative agglomeration) –0.016 –0.029 –0.603∗∗ –0.071 –0.192 –0.153
[0.159] [0.140] [0.177] [0.232] [0.253] [0.203]
D (relative dilation) 1.023 1.012 1.200∗∗ 1.042 1.089 1.073
[0.069] [0.057] [0.044] [0.053] [0.063] [0.046]
S (relative selection) 0.024∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.024 ∗∗ 0.018 ∗∗ 0.027 ∗∗
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003]
Observations 4479 4479 4479 4479 4479 4479
R2 0.649 0.576 0.338 0.439 0.509 0.457
Note: Estimation method proposed by Combes et al. (2009) is used. Standard errors are calculated by 100
bootstrapping iterations. TFP is estimated by the ﬁxed eﬀect OLS.
Bootstrapped standard errors in square parentheses.
**: for A and S signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at the 5 percent, for D signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1 at 5 percent.
Table 5: Plant density and interquartile range of productivity distribution
(1) (2) (3)
Measure of Productivity TFP Output per pot Output per worker
ln(density) -0.0276∗ -0.129∗∗ -0.130∗∗
(0.0151) (0.0453) (0.0539)
Constant 0.256∗∗ 0.860∗∗ 0.811∗∗
(0.0280) (0.0876) (0.104)
Observations 45 45 45
Adjusted R2 0.071 0.111 0.102
Note: The dependent variables are the interquartile range of the productivity distribution at the prefectural level.
TFP is estimated by the ﬁxed eﬀect OLS.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Table 6: Plant density and percentiles of productivity distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Measure of Output per Output per Output per Output per Output per Output per Output per Output per
Productivity TFP TFP TFP TFP Pot Pot Pot Pot Worker Worker Worker Worker
Percentiles 10th 25th 75th 90th 10th 25th 75th 90th 10th 25th 75th 90th
ln(density) 0.0506∗ 0.0430∗ 0.0154 0.0189 0.197∗∗ 0.181∗∗ 0.0527 0.0546 0.191∗∗ 0.169∗∗ 0.0387 0.0672
(0.0290) (0.0243) (0.0155) (0.0141) (0.0772) (0.0764) (0.0560) (0.0475) (0.0801) (0.0804) (0.0535) (0.0473)
Constant -0.286∗∗ -0.168∗∗ 0.0875∗∗ 0.166∗∗ 3.122∗∗ 3.432∗∗ 4.292∗∗ 4.557∗∗ 3.138∗∗ 3.453∗∗ 4.264∗∗ 4.473∗∗
(0.0509) (0.0422) (0.0254) (0.0224) (0.139) (0.136) (0.0901) (0.0788) (0.147) (0.145) (0.0825) (0.0724)
Year ﬁxed eﬀect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.046 0.145 0.292 0.115 0.117 0.202 0.318 0.075 0.087 0.227 0.385
Note: Dependent variables are percentile points of the productivity distribution at the prefectural level. TFP is
estimated by the ﬁxed eﬀect OLS.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
23Table 7: Plant-level productivity growth rate, 1909 to 1916
Panel A. Measure of productivity: TFP
All plants Start-up plants
Standard Standard
Cluster vs. Non-cluster Obs. Mean deviation t-value Obs. Mean deviation t-value
Cluster 448 0.279 0.680 115 0.417 0.829
Non-cluster 461 0.311 1.053 83 0.640 1.842
All 909 0.295 0.888 198 0.510 1.350
Diﬀerence 0.032 0.059 0.535 0.223 0.194 1.148
(Cluster/Non-cluster)
Panel B. Measure of productivity: Output per pot
All plants Start-up plants
Standard Standard
Cluster vs. Non-cluster Obs. Mean deviation t-value Obs. Mean deviation t-value
Cluster 448 0.471 1.011 115 0.676 1.219
Non-cluster 461 0.494 1.568 83 1.053 3.014
All 909 0.482 1.323 198 0.834 2.163
Diﬀerence 0.023 0.088 0.265 0.377 0.311 1.213
(Cluster/Non-cluster)
Panel C. Measure of productivity: Output per worker
All plants Start-up plants
Standard Standard
Cluster vs. Non-cluster Obs. Mean deviation t-value Obs. Mean deviation t-value
Cluster 448 0.459 1.049 115 0.652 1.198
Non-cluster 461 0.489 1.551 83 1.009 2.973
All 909 0.474 1.327 198 0.802 2.131
Diﬀerence 0.030 0.088 0.337 0.357 0.307 1.164
(Cluster/Non-cluster)
Note: TFP is estimated by the ﬁxed eﬀect OLS. t-value columns show the results of the t-test. The null hypotheses



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Map of Japan and the density of silk-reeling plants in 1909

































































































































































(c) Both selection and agglomeration
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Figure 3: Kernel densities of plant-level productivity
28A Mathematical Appendix (not for publication)
A.1 Derivation of dˆ h
ds (eq.(9))




























































A.2 Derivation of Ne (eq.(13))
























g(h)dh − NeE(Q)G(ˆ h)
Since Q = E(Q) in the equilibrium, we can write Q as a function of Ne and ˆ h:
Q(Ne,ˆ h) =
Ne






Also, by rearranging (6) (ˆ h = p − wQ −
√
wf), we get another expression of
Q =




































(p − h)g(h)dh −
∫ ˆ h
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A.4 Derivation of dNp/ds























(ˆ h − h +
√
wf)g(h)dh,
30the term in the brackets is
dNe
dˆ h
G(ˆ h) + Neg(ˆ h) =
−G(ˆ h)
∫ ˆ h
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Let J denote the numerator.
J = −G(ˆ h)
∫ ˆ h
0
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√
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= −pG(ˆ h)2 + G(ˆ h)
∫ ˆ h
0






= −pG(ˆ h)2 + G(ˆ h)
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= −pG(ˆ h)2 + ˆ hG(ˆ h)2 − G(ˆ h)
∫ ˆ h
0

















= −(p − ˆ h)
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31This is negative because
[




is positive, since G(ˆ h) ≥ G(h) for all h ∈ [0,ˆ h]
and G(ˆ h) > g(ˆ h),
32    wp-1 
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